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Introduction
The philosophical debate over transitional justice as a concept can be traced back to ancient 
Greece. Some of its most central problems were already addressed in Aeschylus’s trilogy of The 
Oresteia where Athena played the transitional role of casting the decisive vote for pardoning 
Orestes and saving him from the Furies (the Erinnyes).1 Yet, the linguistic expression “transitional 
justice” has been adopted for the first time in its technical sense by R. Teitel during late 1980s who 
then formulated the basic principles of this emerging discipline in her path-breaking work on the 
subject.2
Since its appearance, the term was immediately discussed and criticized due to its combination 
of two apparently irreconcilable elements: the idea of justice and the idea of change through time—
transition. The skepticism accompanying the birth of transitional justice as a study area was thus 
characterized since the beginning by a continuous attempt of defining the field, an attempt which is 
even now far from having been completed.3 Some views have challenged the notion of transitional 
justice as a form of compromise among contracting parties whereas others have instead considered 
it as a specific context of application of general normative principles independently justified (hence 
the proper interpretation of “transitional”).4
The specific task for a normatively framed programme of justice in transition is the focus 
of some of the most influential literature in the field as, for instance, in R. Teitel (2003), where 
the author considers how twentieth-century institutional and legal developments of transitional 
justice revolved around three major historical events/phases: I) the post-Second World phase of the 
Nuremberg Trials prosecuting Nazis’ generals, II) the post-Cold War phase which has modified the 
bipolar equilibrium and opened democratization processes, and finally, III) the steady-state phase 
of transitional justice.5
Whereas the first phase of the Nuremberg trials was characterized by a very limited scope 
dominated by criminal law, the post-Cold War phase moved beyond a mere retributive strategy 
and looked for social and interparty restoration. What emerged was a dichotomy between truth 
and justice, where truth commissions as ad hoc institutions favoring reconciliation were created. 
In addition to the trade of justice for truth, this second phase was characterized by the trade of 
justice for peace. A large amount of literature developed in relation to concepts of “forgiveness” or 
“reconciliation.” Finally, phase II reinterpreted the universalist view on the rule of law typical of 
phase I and considered it as dependent on state-particularist perspective. Universality was therefore 
seen as embedded in contingent political contexts. Even if characterized by institutional innovation, 
the second phase was nevertheless limited by circumstances linked to nation-state transitions. Such 
constraints are now inadequate for the understanding of the global dimension, which is instead 
1 On the transitional justice interpretations of The Orestea, see B. Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored Violence, 
Imagining Political Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, 108 ff.
2 R. Teitel, Transitional Justice, New York, NY: Oxford University Press 2000. 
3 In this regard, P. De Greiff has recently affirmed that: “Finally, and most surprising, there is no fully worked-out 
conception of transitional justice even in the most influential works in the field”, P. De Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional 
Justice”, in M.S. Williams, R. Nagy and J. Elster (eds), Transitional Justice, New York-London: New York University Press 
2012: 32.
4 This latter thesis is defended by P. De Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional Justice,” cit., p. 58 ff.
5 R. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” cit.
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typical of the third phase. This latter, indeed, due to the permanent action of investigation and 
prosecution assigned to the International Criminal Court has normalized the exceptionality of the 
special tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia.6 This process of normalization is also connected to 
the expected change of role of transitional justice into the politics of prevention and self-defense 
from terrorist attacks. The latter events have placed the scope of transitional justice strategies more 
directly into the field of economic and political transformations of the global world and raised the 
question of the opportunity of global rule of law.7
This collection of chapters aims to bring conceptual clarity to the study and practice of transitional 
justice. Theorists and practitioners of transitional justice are interested in the aftermath of conflict and 
large-scale human rights abuses: how do nations and political groups address past wrongs in order to 
create (sometimes recreate) a decent civil order? The question as noticed is very old and it is still very 
much with us in recent history: from the failure to account for the Armenian Genocide, through the 
Nuremberg Trials, denazification, lustration policies in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism, 
the creation of ad hoc and then a permanent International Criminal Tribunal, the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission—all offered different answers. If the twentieth century was the 
nightmarish, barbaric century of genocide, it was also an epoch in which the question of how to 
account for mass crimes has been taken most seriously. Needless to say, the question is still relevant, 
as we consider how best to transition to sustainable democracy after years of authoritarian rule in 
Egypt, Libya and Syria, to pluck but a few names from recent headlines.
The study of transitional justice in recent decades has been interdisciplinary, running the gamut 
from philosophy through theology, sociology, anthropology, law and recently even neuroscience.8 
The field had its contemporary birth with the creation of the Nuremberg Tribunals after the Second 
World War, the first successful and effective trials for large-scale war crimes. But the concern with 
accountability for past wrongs went into a deep freeze with the Cold War and the inability of the 
two great powers to agree on the nature and orientation of international norms. Interest reemerged 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the past several decades we have seen the creation of new 
ad hoc criminal tribunals (e.g., the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Cambodia) as well as the rise 
of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (most famously in South Africa) and other semi-judicial 
bodies (e.g., Rwanda’s Gacaca courts).9
In spite of the exponential growth of interest in this area, there have been surprisingly few attempts 
to provide a systematic conceptual grounding of the nature, aims and limitations of transitional 
justice. Perhaps this theoretical lack is due to the different contexts in which transitional policies 
are put into practice. One of the chapters herein suggests as much. Perhaps it is due to the vastly 
disparate scholarly methodologies employed by academics who take up such questions. Be that as 
it may, the collection before you seeks to fill this lacuna by asking a wide range of established, as 
well as up and coming writers, to “theorize” transitional justice—to reflect on how the interaction 
between moral, political, legal and conceptual questions shapes our practices after war. What 
kind of justice is transitional justice? What are the contradictions between its transitionality and 
6 R. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” cit.
7 These opening paragraphs are a revised extrapolation from Corradetti, C. 2013. “Philosophical Issues in Transitional 
Justice Theory: A (Provisional) Balance.” Politica e Società 2/2013: 185–220.
8 See, e.g., a recent initiative to study the connection between neuroscience and post-conflict strategies inaugurated by 
Beyond Conflict, a non-profit organization based in Tufts University. A report on a recent conference organized by Beyond 
Conflict on this topic can be found here: Beyond Conflict. 2012. “Neuroscience and Social Conflict: Identifying New 
Approaches for the 21st Century.” Accessed July 9, 2014. http://www.beyondconflictint.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
Neuroscience_Bro_v2_optimized.pdf.
9 For a discussion of different cases and strategies of reparation see Brooks, R.L. 1999. When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The 
Controversy over Apologies and Reparations for Human Injustice. New York: New York University Press.
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its justness? What are the operative assumptions that any state seriously engaging in transitional 
policies entertains? How do we understand the tensions between the desire to hold criminals 
responsible for what they have done and the need to generate political and economic stability for 
a new state? Are the major dilemmas of transitional justice themselves transitory, to be dispelled 
with the creation of a settled democracy, or do they continue to animate the political life of a state 
founded (as so many are) in great injustice? What is the potential of transitional justice to bring 
about social change? More specifically, how and when can it promote political reconciliation? How 
and when can it bring about significant structural and economic reform? What are the interactions 
between transitional justice practices and a new state’s cultural life? Are some social-scientific and 
philosophical methodologies more promising than others in trying to address these questions? In 
regard to these questions the volume represents one of the few systematic attempts to take on the 
theory of transitional justice from a philosophical perspective given that as De Greiff has recently 
affirmed: at present “ … there is no fully worked-out conception of transitional justice even in the 
most influential works in the field.”10
Absence in systematic philosophical literature in this field does not amount to a complete 
lack of engagement in some of the core themes by individual philosophers which sporadically, 
but significantly, contributed to the setting up of the discussion. This is for instance, the case of 
Adorno’s contribution on what it means to “come to terms with the past” which expanded on 
Arendt’s and Jaspers’ opening of the debate about “the German Guilt,” revived then once again by 
Habermas’ and Minchnik’s discussion of post-war reconciliation between Germany and Poland.11
More generally, some of the philosophical problems raised by transitional justice concern the 
reframing of the opposition between ideal versus non-ideal justice. This seems suggested by John 
Rawls’ reference to improvements of the conditions for non-well-ordered and burdened societies 
as “questions of transition”―as he refers to them―but with no indication on the specific steps and 
institutions to adopt.12 Another central area of philosophical debate to emerge recently has focused 
on the question of whether it is possible to define transitional justice as a form of special justice or 
if, instead, it has to be regarded as a form of normal justice.13 This question is of central importance 
because if transitional justice is sui generis, it is far from clear that our best theories of justice apply 
to transitional settings. If, on the other hand, the question of justice in times of momentous political 
change is at bottom a question about ordinary justice, then many of the normative questions of 
transitional justice have already been addressed in previous theorizing. Other areas of interest 
include the opposition between forgiveness and forgetting as ways for transitional societies to 
confront the past; the understanding of the nature of evil; as well as the normativity of historical 
10 De Greiff, P. 2014. “Theorizing Transitional Justice.” In Transitional Justice, edited by M.S. Williams, R. Nagy 
and J. Elster. New York and London: New York University Press. An excellent collection of essays published in 2014: 
Buckley-Zistel, S., Beck, T., Braun, C., Mieth, F. (eds). 2014. Transitional Justice Theories. New York: Routledge. Provides 
outstanding methodological coverage but does not put equal emphasis on philosophical inquiry. 
11 Adorno, T.W. 1986. “What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?” In Bitburg in Moral and Political 
Perspective, edited by G.H. Harman. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
See also, Arendt, H. 1978. “Organised Guilt and Collective Responsibility [1945].” In The Jew as Pariah: Jewish 
Identity and Politics in the Modern Age, edited by R.H. Feldman. New York: Grove Press; Jaspers, K. 1961. The Question 
of German Guilt. New York: Capricorn Books; Habermas, J. and Michnik, A. 1994. “Overcoming the Past.” New Left 
Review 1/203: 3–16. 
12 Rawls, J. 1999. The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. For a comprehensive overview of 
some of the crucial philosophical themes in transitional justice theory, see Corradetti, 2013: 185–220.
13 Posner, E.A. and Vermeule, A. 2003. “Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice.” In Public Law and Legal 
Theory, Working Paper n. 40. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/40.eap-
av.transitional.both_.pdf. Nir Eisikovits also takes up this question in his entry on Transitional Justice in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-transitional) as well as in the recent essay Eisikovits, 
N. 2013. “Peace versus Justice in Transitional Settings.” Politica e Società 2/2013: 221–36.
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memory within time, etc. An especially important chapter by Jeremy Waldron merits noting in 
this context as it has raised the possibility that the force of claims for historical justice can fade 
over time. This discussion not only suggests an interesting and controversial relationship between 
the abstract claims of justice and the force of changed circumstances, it also constitutes a prime 
example of non-ideal philosophizing about transitional justice. It raises the possibility that non-
ideal theory is perhaps especially well-suited for taking up the philosophical questions involved.14 
Other important work in the non-ideal theory of transitional justice has taken up the question 
of how international norms of transitional justice emerge. Thus, Kathryn Sikkink, in her major 
recent book, The Justice Cascade15 has investigated how international prosecutions are becoming 
an international norm and expectation influencing both the prospects of transition and creating a 
potential for deterrence. In a similar vein, Michal Ben Josef’s Hirsch’s recent scholarship traces 
the growth and increasing acceptance of truth commissions as instruments of Transitional Justice.16
The unfinished project of transitional justice does not include simply the already mentioned 
abstract conceptualizations at the normative and metaethical level but it is reflected also in 
the classificatory criteria for the typological varieties of transitional justice processes. The 
phenomenology of transitional justice events has itself become more inclusive and moved far 
beyond the initial stage of post-conflict transitions. Now, one can speak also of transitional 
justice processes within democratic settings as well as of transitions in non-transitional contexts.17 
Today, there is even a further area of application, as it is the case for the so-called “transitional 
jurisprudence” of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in regard to the former Soviet 
states that are now members of the Council of Europe (CoE) and subject to the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR).18 In all these cases the ECtHR adopted the principle of “self-defending” 
or “militant democracy” as guidance for delimiting, on temporally constrained bases and mainly 
on issues concerning electoral participation of extremist parties, in order to favor the achievement 
of democratic stability.19
All considered and to a large extent, the more or less inclusiveness of transitional justice 
phenomena as part of a single coherent framework depends very much on whether a merely 
descriptive approach is confronted with a normative one; that is, one in which transformations are 
seen as oriented towards democratic advancement. If the first approach characterizes J. Elster’s 
path-breaking work on transitions, the latter approach is significantly endorsed and developed by 
R. Teitel, the founder of the contemporary scholarship on transitional justice, as well as one of the 
most important scholars today on transitional justice.20
The book has seven sections. The first centers on the most basic assumption in the field—that 
political reconstruction requires a reckoning with past wrongs. Rotondi and Eisikovits question this 
“memory assumption,” almost axiomatic in writings about transitional justice, which dictates that a 
violent past must be addressed in any process of transition. The received view underlying much of 
14 Waldron, J. 2001. “Superseding Historical Injustice.” Ethics 1/103: 4–28. 
15 Sikkink, K. 2011. The Justice Cascade. New York: Norton.
16 See, for example, Ben-Josef Hirsch, M. 2012. “Ideational Change and the Emergence of the International Norm of 
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions.” European Journal of International Relations. Accessed August 15, 2014. http://ejt.
sagepub.com/content/early/2013/07/09/1354066113484344.full.pdf+html.
17 Hansen, T.O. 2011. “Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory.” Oregon Review of International Law 
1: 10–13.
18 For a legal analysis of some of the most important cases in this respect see: Sweeney, J. 2012. The European Court 
of Human Rights in the post-Cold War Era: Universality in Transition. London: Routledge.
19 The historical antecedent of the self-defending democracy principle was the “wehrhafte Demokratie” principle 
adopted in the post-Nazi Gemany transition.
20 See respectively: Elster, J. 2004. Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; Teitel, R. 2000. Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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the literature is that impunity, burial of the past, unaccountability, not only impede transition but also 
exacerbate the divide between victims and oppressors. But is this always and unconditionally true? 
The authors argue that under specific circumstances, a (qualified) argument for not remembering 
can be formulated. They consider three cases in which the memory assumption is problematic:
1. post-conflict societies that evidence a widespread cultural ambivalence about policies of 
accountability for past wrongs;
2. conflicts where there is an immensely complicated division of guilt between the parties; and
3. political situations where an insistence on immediate commemoration and thorough 
accountability risks reigniting the conflict.
Like Rotondi and Eisikovits, Lawther is also interested in the possibility of a transition without 
addressing past wrongs. Based on over 40 semi-structured interviews conducted with groups and 
individuals involved in the decades-long conflict in Northern Ireland, Lawther wonders if it is 
possible to achieve peace without excavating the past. More importantly, can silencing the past 
be beneficial rather than detrimental to stability? The question is taken up in the Northern Irish 
context, where transitional justice mechanisms have been implemented in the absence of a clear 
truth process. Commenting insightfully about the role of trust in any policy of post-war truth-
telling, the author provides both a set of interpretations for why truth-telling was neglected in the 
Northern Irish transition and of the possibilities that picking it up could generate.
The second part of the book takes up the subject of punishment (and refraining from 
punishment) in a process of transition. Espindola articulates a two-pronged attack on Carl Schmitt’s 
famous argument for amnesties in the aftermath of World War II: Schmitt’s defense fails to take 
into account the moral importance of retributive sentiments and the possibility of channeling 
them into productive responses by means of transitional policies. More devastatingly, Schmitt’s 
support of amnesties is inconsistent with much else in his writing—primarily the insistence that 
political communities have the exclusive ability to identify who their own enemies are and treat 
them accordingly. As Espindola puts it: “Schmittian amnesties violate Schmitt’s own principle of 
epistemic privilege of political communities with respect to the paradigmatic political decision 
about how the enemy should be dealt with.”
Murphy’s chapter provides us with a sophisticated and important comparison between the 
aims and scope of retributive and transitional justice. She argues that the retributive justification 
for punishment, quite coherent in settled contexts, does not hold up in circumstances of 
political transition. If, as part of our transitional policy, we are to punish those associated with 
a deposed authoritarian regime (and Murphy accepts that such punishments can be appropriate) 
the justification for punishment cannot be purely retributive. Murphy sets several tasks for any 
theory of punishment in transitional settings. Chief among these are determining how a perpetrator 
becomes liable for punishment (though the wrongs he is accused of may well have been legal at 
the time of commission), why the new state should try to punish under transitional circumstances 
and whether/how it can do so effectively.
Part III examines the potential (or lack thereof) of transitional policies to bring about lasting 
structural change and to truly mold a new polity’s economic and constitutional institutions. Taking 
her bearings from Young’s understanding of responsibility as based in structural injustices (i.e. 
we are responsible not only for our specific acts but also for participating in, benefiting from and 
upholding structural distortions in our political system), Thomason sketches a theory of transitional 
justice as structural justice. Her account focuses on the background conditions that led to strife in 
the first place rather than on particular acts of violence. As she puts it, “Structural injustice occurs 
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when institutions and systems work in such a way to disadvantage large groups of people while 
allowing others to benefit. Structural justice, then, would require that institutions and systems work 
to ensure that large groups of people are not disadvantaged.” The main task of transitional justice 
policies according to such a model is to end or prevent wide-scale disenfranchisement of certain 
groups. This involves identifying (and abolishing) the institutions and practices that contributed 
to the disenfranchisement in the past and constructing the kind of institutions that would be less 
likely to engage in it again.
Phillips argues, convincingly, that settler states, often created at terrible human and material cost to 
indigenous populations, must concentrate their transitional justice efforts on the political empowerment 
of the groups they have dispossessed. Transitional measures must “allow indigenous populations the 
right to participate, as an equal, in the resolution of justice claims.” Such a commitment calls for 
looking beyond the relatively narrow focus of truth commissions, war crime trials, or compensation 
programs to claims about “political” or “constitutional” justice arising from the original wrongdoing 
and dispossession. Phillips considers two case studies and argues that Australia has failed to address 
such questions of political and constitutional justice when it comes to the status of the aboriginal 
population, while New Zealand’s approach to the plight of the Maori shows far greater promise. The 
chapter is significant not only for its insistence on the centrality of political and constitutional justice 
but also for the implied argument expanding the scope of transitional justice to states (like Australia 
and New Zealand) no longer in the acute throws of a transition.
McAuliffe’s chapter, an exemplary exercise in non-ideal theory, gives us an account of why 
transitional justice often falls short of its ambitions to effect structural change in new democracies. 
The belief that transitional justice can transform the pathological economic structures of countries 
undergoing transition depends on the flawed assumption that transitional policies can be lifted 
wholesale “from standard blueprints.” And this, in spite of much scholarly work that supposes 
otherwise, cannot be done. McAuliffe’s chapter seeks to explain why it is that transitional justice does 
not carry the kind of limitless potential for redistributing resources and ushering in an era of greater 
socioeconomic fairness. The explanation is solidly grounded in the political economy of transitions 
and among the chief reasons he identifies is the reluctance of old power elites to relinquish economic 
advantage (a reluctance bolstered by their lingering strength and leverage) and the difficulty, (see the 
case of Afghanistan) at least in some contexts, to extend central power beyond the capital city.
The next section explores the nature and limits of political reconciliation, which many consider 
as the telos or aim of transitional policies. Taking her bearings from the writings of Auschwitz 
survivor Jean Améry, Hunt provides a defense of resentment as a response to wrongdoing. She 
suggests that resentment can be interpreted as a source for victims’ empowerment whenever the 
sentiment is acknowledged by a community of survivors. The author explores the paradoxical 
possibility of reconcilable resentment—a form of resentment that can be productive for political 
reconciliation. One possible avenue of understanding resentment along these lines is viewing it 
as one legitimate, non-exclusive option available in transition (alongside, e.g., forgiveness). Here 
the author is in dialogue with Brudholm’s important work on the subject. The upshot of such a 
legitimization of resentment is that even in the case of an agreed policy of forgiveness, a “right to 
resent” must be recognized as a means of criticizing policies of normalization.
Metz offers a novel and important theory of national reconciliation based in African ideas 
about community. His version of communitarianism illuminates the relationship between different 
elements of political reconstruction, including truth-telling, apology, forgiveness, compensation 
and amnesty. For Metz the understanding of community (and, consequently, how to rebuild a 
community) turns on two relationships: “identity” and “solidarity.” The former asks us to “share a 
way of life” with others; the latter requires that we be willing to act for the benefit of our compatriots. 
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Metz argues that the requirements of reconciliation are behavioral rather than attitudinal. Genuine 
community does not require us to feel like we forgive or love others. It just asks us to behave as if 
we are beginning to belong to the same group as they do.
Mookherjee puts forward an account of political reconciliation based on Sen’s Capabilities 
Approach. Steering clear of the debate between a thick idea of political reconciliation, (unpalatable 
to most liberal theorists as it aggressively promotes a single idea of the good) and thin conceptions 
(based on the creation of civic trust where the goal is simply the institutionalization of impartiality), 
she offers a third possibility: Reconciliation-as-Agency. The approach adopted here aims at the re-
imagination of all relevant actors as human beings who can pursue a plurality of goals beyond 
simple subsistence.
The fifth section of the book explores the relationship between transitional justice and artistic 
expressions and practices. Bahun’s chapter provides us with a magisterial survey of how art 
interacts with transitional mechanisms. She argues that the arts can enhance the scope and impact 
of transitional justice efforts; she also insists that under some circumstances they can undermine 
these efforts. Beginning with the premise that art practices, formative of a nation’s culture, can be 
both implicated in past abuses and crucial for future transformation, Bahun gives us a taxonomy 
of how different art forms interact with different types of transitional policies. The argument 
provides powerful evidence for the understudied force of the arts and how they represent past 
wrongs, highlight the weaknesses and absurdities in a process of transition and also contribute 
to the amelioration, and perhaps even eventual repair, of fraught social ties. Towards the end of 
her chapter, Bahun gives us useful methodological guidance for studying the role of the arts in 
transitions, stressing the importance of a comparative approach.
Mihai’s chapter ‘Democratic “Sacred Spaces”: Public Architecture and Transitional Justice’, 
considers how newly established democracies should deal with architecture created by a deposed 
authoritarian regime. Following Levinson’s notion of “sacred space” as a structuring of the social 
order, the author takes up the problem of structures that were erected to aggrandize a troubling 
ideology or to communicate a sense of collective humiliation. Two cases are analyzed: South Africa’s 
Voortrekker monument ‒ a racist edifice celebrating the ‘civilization’ of the Zulus by the white 
Trekkers—and the Romanian Civic Centre, an architectural complex declaring the supremacy of 
Ceauşescu. The respective transitional polities are judged to have mishandled these old monuments, 
each failing to neutralize or sufficiently address the weight of humiliation that the structures carry.
Part VI offers philosophical accounts of key operative concepts pertaining to transitions: time, 
genocide, and political repair. Corradetti’s “Transitional Times, Reflective Judgment and the ‘Hōs 
mē’ Condition” brings together Agamben’s notion of temporality and Kant’s idea of reflective 
judgment to demonstrate the essential interdependence of restorative and retributive justice in 
transitional societies. The synthesis of past and present implicit in Agamben’s understanding of 
eschatological time suggests a more subtle conception of justice than a traditional chronological 
approach can provide. According to Corradetti, temporality as interpreted by Agamben offers a 
crucial, although mostly overlooked, framework for theories of transitional justice. Corradetti 
argues that Kant’s notion of reflective judgment is particularly relevant in this temporal perspective 
because it is capable of addressing past wrongdoing while at the same time focusing on the future 
construction of identity. The larger aim of Corradetti’s argument is to show that it is possible 
to maintain the normative aspect of justice while at the same time focusing on the complex 
circumstances that characterize political transitions.
Building on her previous work, Card asks us to think through the conceptual implications 
of understanding genocide as “social death” or the loss of social vitality. By social vitality is 
meant “the meanings, shapes, and contents given the lives of individuals by social relationships, 
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personal and institutional, contemporary and inter-generational, that unite them into a people … 
” Her account poses a series of fascinating puzzles: does the elimination of an evil group like, for 
example the KKK, count as genocide (since its evil practices do impart meaning to the lives of 
its members)? Does the prosecution of groups constituted on specific attributes of the members 
(such as sexual orientation or gender) count as genocide (as these groupings also account for social 
vitality)? What does the social death thesis tell us about the relationship between the quantity of 
people killed and the quality of ties destroyed?
Walker’s chapter provides an important philosophical account of the undertheorized and 
underutilized transitional instrument of reparations. The contemporary discussion of reparative 
justice lacks a clear terminology and seems to assume that repair for past wrongs is impossible. In 
practice, reparations are the least popular instrument of transitional justice, and when they are used 
very little attention is paid to the actual needs of victims. Walker offers a novel and compelling 
relational view of reparations. These must be “about demonstrating (rather than establishing) 
relations of accountability and reciprocity … ” Any meaningful attempt at reparations should 
address the material needs of victims (and it is important that victims participate in defining these), 
acknowledge wrongs perpetrated, and signal willingness to base future relationships on mutual 
accountability and responsibility.
The book’s seventh and last section takes up two case studies, one ancient, and the other 
contemporary, which provide a unique inductive perspective on how transitions should be shaped. 
Taking his bearings from the democratic reconstruction of Athens after the abortive rule of the Thirty 
Tyrants (403 bce), Gowder argues that new democracies should stick to their original decisions 
about how to handle past crimes and must create the political institutions to help them do so. Such 
steadfastness cements public commitment to the rule of law and provides an outlet for lawful 
participation in political life. More precisely, for Gowder, the commitment to our post-war policies 
and the design of institutions necessary for carrying them out, are what it means to create the rule of 
law in a new democracy. And without signaling that the rule of law is to be taken seriously, the new 
state cannot protect itself against the resurgence of the old power elites that have just been ousted.
Building on her research into Rwanda’s post genocide transition, Tirrell argues, compellingly, 
that a coherent and successful transition policy must focus on retributive justice, public truth-telling, 
focused reparations and economic development. Ultimately, it is the combination of these factors that 
can restore the dignity of victims and begin to mend what she has called, elsewhere, “recognition 
harm.” Since these areas of focus are mutually enhancing, it is only their interdependence that has 
the potential to generate lasting and stable peace. As Tirrell puts it: “Punishment of offenders and 
material repair are each individually insufficient for this task, but when combined with economic 
development and enhanced protection of human rights, there are better odds of creating a social and 
political system in which all have a voice, one which offers a shared narrative that fosters mutual 
recognition.”
All in all, these sections suggest key areas for further theoretical investigation where it is likely 
that a convergence of scholarly interest will occur in the near future. As mentioned, we are witness 
to a multiplicity of state and legal transformations which are not only affecting interstate relations, 
but also questioning the mission and the scope of competences for international organizations such 
as the UN and the EU policies, the Council of Europe’s functions and internal power balancing 
or even the more prominent role that some regional organizations are assuming as a result of the 
proactive role of the International Criminal Court. The multiplicity of factors involved in state 
and regional transformations require a new understanding of justice in times of transition.21 This 
21 One of the pioneering books in this respect was Kritz, N.J. (ed.) 1995. Transitional Justice. How Emerging 
Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
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is not only due to the numerous failures characterizing political responses to past atrocities but 
also the more complex dynamics now developing among different civil and institutional actors 
which contribute to formulate more adequate responses to the transformation of society and the 
rehabilitation of its basic conditions of fairness. Also, the methodological rethinking of justice in 
transitional times raises the question of what type of explanatory framework it aims to promote and 
also the question of “what do we expect” from a theory of transitional justice. Answers can vary but 
what cannot be ignored is that the international community is called to play an ever more decisive 
role in ending impunity and injustice. The fragility of transitions, the reversibility and tentativeness 
of any perceived “successes,” as well as the growing complexity of interactions between local, 
international, modern and traditional institutions involved, requires that we achieve as much 
conceptual clarity as possible about transitions. We hope this volume answers some questions 
about how to understand transitional times and what can be expected, morally, practically and 
legally from post-war processes. As many of the chapters in this book argue, remaking a state is a 
thankless and all too often tragic task. To offer any assistance, however small, to those engaged in 
this Herculean task is a great reward indeed.
Boston-Oslo, July 2014
Claudio Corradetti, Nir Eisikovits, and Jack Volpe Rotondi
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